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LABOR  MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION 

OF WAGES,  1973-1992:  A  SEMIPARAMETRIC APPROACH 

BY JOHN DINARDO, NICOLEM.  FORTIN, AND  THOMAS LEMIEUX' 
This paper presents a semiparametric procedure to analyze the effects of institutional 
and labor market factors on recent changes in the U.S. distribution of wages. The effects 
of  these  factors  are  estimated  by  applying  kernel  density  methods  to  appropriately 
weighted samples. The procedure provides a visually clear representation of where in the 
density  of  wages these  various  factors exert  the  greatest  impact. Using data from  the 
Current Population  Survey, we  find, as in  previous  research,  that  de-unionization and 
supply and demand shocks were important factors in explaining the rise in wage inequality 
from  1979 to 1988. We  find  also  compelling visual and quantitative  evidence  that the 
decline in the real value of  the minimum wage explains a substantial proportion of  this 
increase  in  wage  inequality,  particularly  for  women.  We  conclude  that  labor  market 
institutions are as important as supply and demand considerations in explaining changes 
in the U.S. distribution of  wages from 1979 to 1988. 
KEYWORDS:Wage inequality, kernel density estimation, minimum wage, unions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IT HAS BEEN  WELL  ESTABLISHED with a wide variety of  measures and data bases 
that overall wage inequality increased substantially in the United States during 
the 1980's.~  Recent papers have argued that changes in the U.S. wage structure 
are primarily due to secular increases in the relative demand for skilled workers 
(Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)), and that therefore, factors such as interna- 
tional trade (Murphy and Welch (1991)) and skill-biased technological shocks 
(Bound and Johnson (1992)) have played a major role. Katz and Murphy (1942), 
among others, have argued that these changes in demand, in combination with 
the  slowdown in the rate of  growth in  the supply of  skilled workers, are the 
leading causes of the observed changes in the structure of  wages3  "Institutional" 
factors have also been implicated. Bound and Johnson (1992) have shown that 
the decline of  "high-rent"  industries explains some of  the increase in  the skill 
premium. Both Card (1996) and Freeman (1993) have found that de-unioniza- 
tion explains about one fifth of  the increase in men's wage inequality over the 
1980's. On the other hand, much of  the previous literature on the distributional 
'We would like to thank Moshe Buchinsky, Daniel Hamermesh, Bentley MacLeod, Serena Ng, 
Robert Valletta, Jean Wohlever, a co-editor, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and 
discussions. Fortin and Lemieux gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Council of Canada and from the Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et 1'Aide 
2 la Recherche, QuCbec. 
'see  Levy and Murnane (1992) for a recent survey of studies documenting the increase in wage 
inequality. 
3~ee  also  Bound  and  Johnson  (1992),  Freeman  and  Needels  (1993),  Katz,  Loveman,  and 
Blanchflower (1995), and Katz and Revenga (1989). 1002  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
effects of  the minimum wage has concluded that minimum-wages are relatively 
~nimportant.~ 
Most analyses have focused on education and experience wage differentials, 
as well as various inequality indices such as the variance of  log wages or the Gini 
coefficient. We instead focus on the entire density of  wages, a focus which has 
important  consequences for our conclusions. To illustrate  the importance  of 
considering the density of wages, we display, in Figures la  and lb, hours-weighted 
kernel estimates of  the density of  hourly wages for men and for women over the 
period 1973-1992.~  A vertical line in each of  the figures indicates the value of 
the federal minimum wage in the respective year.6 From these figures, there is 
clear evidence that the minimum wage compresses the lower tail of  the density 
of  wages, especially for women.'  This large  "visual"  impact of  the  minimum 
wage prompted  us  to investigate its role in  recent  changes in wage inequality 
more formally. 
In  this  study  we  propose  and  implement  a  semiparametric  procedure  to 
analyze the role of  institutional and labor market factors in  recent changes in 
the distribution of wages. The main methodological contribution of  the paper is 
to develop an estimation procedure that yields a visually clear representation of 
the impact of  various explanatory factors. This methodological contribution  is 
substantively important as well: despite all the carefully crafted research on this 
topic, little is known on exactly where in the distribution of wages these various 
factors exert the greatest impact. 
For the sake of  parsimony, we consider five explanatory factors: (i) changes in 
the real value of  the minimum wage, (ii) changes in the unionization level, (iii) 
changes  in  the  distribution  of  workers'  attributes  other  than  unionization, 
including industry affiliation, (iv) changes in the supply and demand of  various 
categories of  workers, and (v) residual or "unexplained"  changes. Factors such 
as  "skill-biased  technological  shocks"  fall  into  the  last  category-residual 
changes. As  in Bound and Johnson (1992), we focus our analysis on the period 
1979-88 that witnessed the most dramatic changes in wage inequality and labor 
market institutions. We also contrast this analysis with some evidence from the 
4The earlier literature on the distributional effects of  the minimum wage (Gramlich (1976)) and 
the more recent work by  Horrigan and Mincy (1993) both conclude that the effect of the minimum 
wage on the  level  of  earnings  inequality  at  a  point  in  time  is  small. This is  not  incompatible, 
however, with changes in the minimum wage having a sizable effect on changes ocer time in wage 
inequality. 
'These  densities  are estimated  using  data from the  May  dual job  holding  supplement of  the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1973 to 1978, and from the outgoing rotation group files of 
the CPS from 1979 to 1992 as explained in Section 2. 
'The  value of the federal minimum wage in real 1979 dollars is also reported in Table I. It rose 
and fell in  erratic steps from  1973 to 1978, and fell in real terms every year  from 1979 to 1989. 
Coverage expanded in 1976; the greater mass to the left of the minimum wage in the early 1970's is 
attributable to smaller coverage. 
7The  largest increase in the minimum wage took place between  1973 and 1974. This explains why 
the compression effect is more evident in 1974 than in 1973. LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 1005  LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS 
periods  1973-1979  and  1988-1992  during  which  wage  inequality  and  labor 
market institutions were more stable. 
Our  semiparametric  procedure  is  very  much  in  the  spirit  of  the  familiar 
Oaxaca (1973) decomposition. These decompositions generally focus on means 
a10ne.~  In contrast, we work with the entire density of  wages. Oaxaca decompo- 
sitions are based on simple counterfactuals such as "how much would a worker, 
with the mean characteristics of  the 1979 workforce, have been paid in  1988?" 
The  key  estimation  problem  in  generalizing  this  type  of  decomposition  to 
densities is to construct a counterfactual  density that would have prevailed in 
1988 if  the characteristics  of  workers had  remained  as in  1979. We  show in 
Section  3 that  counterfactual  densities  can  be  estimated  by  applying known 
estimation methods, such as kernel density estimation, to appropriately weighted 
~amples.~ Like the familiar Oaxaca decomposition, our decompositions ignore 
general  equilibrium  effects, and  depend  on the  ordering  of  the  explanatory 
factors. Despite  these  limitations, we  argue  that  our procedure indicates the 
potential importance of  the various explanatory factors. 
In contrast with most previous work which has used earnings data from the 
March Current Population Survey (CPS), we use hourly wage data from the May 
CPS and from the outgoing rotation group supplements of  the CPS. In Section 
2.1, we  describe our CPS samples and argue that they are key in identifying a 
potential  effect of  the minimum wage. The extension of  classic kernel density 
estimation  to  the  case  of  a  weighted  sample  and  the  choice  of  bandwidth 
selector are explained in Section 2.2. In Section 3, we provide the details of  our 
procedure for estimating the counterfactual densities associated with changes in 
individual attributes (Section 3.2), changes in  the real value  of  the  minimum 
wage (Section 3.3), and changes in the supply and demand for various categories 
of  workers (Section 3.4). We then  explain  in  Section 4 how  we  perform  the 
density decomposition. 
Our main results, focusing on changes in the density of  wages over the period 
1979-1988,  are  reported  in  Section  5.  Like  others,  we  find  that  changing 
unionization rates, changes in the composition of  the workforce, and changes in 
supply and demand are important explanations of the change in wage inequality 
over this period. However, unlike previous research we find that the decline in 
the real value  of  the minimum wage  over the period  1979-1988  had  a large 
visual and quantitative impact on the distribution of wages. Indeed, we find that 
it explains up to twenty-five percent of  the change in the standard deviation of 
men's log wages and up to thirty percent of the change in the standard deviation 
of women's log wages. It is also important in explaining changes in the standard 
deviation both between and within different groups of  workers. 
'similar  techniques have also been used to decompose summary measures of the distribution of 
wages into separate components. For example,  Freeman  (1980)  decomposes  the variance  of  log 
wages into the sum of  the effect  of  unions  and of  the variance  that would have prevailed in the 
absence of unions. 
his approach  can  also  be  used  to  estimate  counterfactual  inequality  indices  (Gini,  Theil, 
differences between the 90th and the 10th centile, etc.) or counterfactual wage differentials. 1006  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
The case of the minimum wage highlights the usefulness of showing precisely 
where the most dramatic changes in the distribution of  wages occur. In fact, the 
visual effect of  the minimum wage on women's wages is overwhelming and gives 
support to the quantitative estimates we also present. We finally show in Section 
6 that labor market institutions remain important when we change the order of 
the main decomposition, and when we consider other time periods. 
2.  DATA  AND  ISSUES  IN  DENSITY  ESTIMATION 
2.1.  The Data 
This paper uses data from the CPS to analyze changes in  the distribution of 
wages in the United States from 1973 to 1992. Starting in May 1973, the CPS 
surveys have regularly collected hourly or weekly earnings for each respondent's 
main job. From 1973 to 1978, these wage questions were asked only in May, as 
part of  the dual job holding supplement. Beginning in 1979, the wage questions 
were  asked  each  month  to  people  in  the  outgoing  rotation  groups  (which 
represent one-quarter of  all individuals in the survey.) Relatively large samples 
of  workers are thus available to estimate changes in the distribution of  hourly 
wages  over the last two decades. The sample sizes are approximately 40,000 
workers per year from 1973 to 1978, and 150,000 workers per year from 1979 to 
1992. The exact sample sizes, for men and women, are reported in Table I. 
A major advantage of  using these samples is that the wage measure collected 
is a good measure of  a "point-of-time" price of labor. By contrast, most previous 
studies on changes in the structure of  wages  in  the United  States have used 
measures of  average weekly earnings on all jobs which  are available from the 
March  CPS."  One problem  with  this  alternative  earnings  concept  is  that  it 
depends on labor supply decisions, and on the choice of  holding more than one 
job. The hourly wage measure used in this paper is thus more closely connected 
to theories of  wage determination  based on supply and demand that focus on 
the hourly price of labor. Similarly, the connection between the minimum wage 
and the hourly wage on the main job is more direct than the connection between 
the minimum wage and average weekly earnings on all jobs. 
Another  key  advantage  of  the  1973-78  dual job  supplements  and  of  the 
1983-92  outgoing rotation group supplements is that they contain information 
on the union  status of  workers. This variable  is  essential  to any  attempt  to 
evaluate  the  effect of  labor market  institutions  on the distribution  of  wages. 
Unfortunately, information on the union status of  workers was not collected in 
the outgoing rotation  group supplements from 1979 to 1982. It is  nevertheless 
possible to obtain the union status in  1979 for a subset of  workers by  matching 
answers about unionization from the 1979 Pension Supplement of  the May 1979 
'O~or  examples of studies using the March CPS, see Katz and Murphy (19921, Murphy and Welch 
(1992), and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). These studies restrict most of their analysis to full-time 
(and sometimes to full-year) workers to minimize the confounding effect of labor supply decisions. 
These restricted samples are not necessarily representative, however, of the whole workforce. TABLE I 

SAMPLE  FROM THE Current Population,kVt?y 1973-1992 

Men  Women 
Minimum  Number  Number 
Real Log  Real Log  of  Real Log  of 
Year  WageP  wageb  Unionc  Nonwhite  Fhkcationd  F%periencee  Observations  wageb  Unionc  Nonwhite  Educationd  ExperienceC  Observations 
a1979Constant Dollars. 

b~tandard deviations and other measures of dispersion are in Table Al. 

'Union  coverage is not available in 1980 or 1982. 

d~tandard deviations of education range from 3.11 in 1973 to 2.68 in 1992 for men and from 2.61 in 1973 to 234 in  1992 for women. 

'Standard  deviations of experience range from 14.01 in 1973 to 11.83 in 1992 for men and from 14.29 in 1973to 12.02 in 1992 for women. 
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CPS to the corresponding wage  data collected in  the outgoing rotation  group 
supplements of  May, June, July, or August, 1979. We  use  this  matched  1979 
sample of  about 35,000 observations whenever the estimation requires using the 
union status for 1979." 
Several  other  preliminary  data  manipulations  were  performed  to  ensure 
enough year  to year continuity in  our  CPS samples. One issue  is that  usual 
weekly earnings are topcoded at $999 from 1973 to 1985, and at $1923 there- 
after. A relatively low value of  the top code in real terms is likely to understate 
wage dispersion in  the upper tail of  the distribution. To avoid this type of  bias, 
we  use  the  upper  tail  of  the  1986 distribution  of  wages  to  impute  a wage 
distribution to the observations censored at the top code in  other years. This 
imputation procedure is used only for years in which more than 0.5 percent of 
the workforce is  topcoded (1981 to 1985 and  1990 to 1992). Our imputation 
procedure  is  similar  to the procedure we  use  to  estimate  the  effect  of  the 
minimum wage on the distribution of wages (Section 3.3). 
All  observations with  allocated wages were eliminated from the  1979-1988 
outgoing rotation group files to keep these samples comparable to the 1973-1978 
samples.''  In addition, only individuals of  age 16 to 65 and reporting an hourly 
wage  from  $1 to  $100 (in  1979 dollars) were  kept  in  the sample. The GDP 
deflator for personal  consumption expenditures was  used  to  convert nominal 
wages into 1979 dollars. 
Note finally that all the estimates reported in this paper are weighted by  the 
product  of  the CPS sample weights with usual  hours  of  work. These  "hours- 
weighted" estimates put more weight on the wages of workers who supply many 
hours to the labor market. This gives a better representation of the dispersion of 
wages for each and every hour worked in the labor market, regardless of who is 
supplying this hour. 
Summary statistics of  the CPS samples are reported in  Table I. While real 
wages decreased for men over the 1973-1992 period, they increased for women. 
The workforce became  increasingly  more  educated  and  nonwhite. Potential 
labor  market  experience (age-education-5) followed a U-shaped  curve  as the 
baby boom generation first entered the labor market during the 1970's and then 
aged during the 1980's. Table I also indicates that while the minimum wage and 
"It  is also possible to obtain the union status of workers for the subsample of workers who were 
in an outgoing rotation group in May 1980, or 1981 since they were asked about their union status in 
the dual job holding supplement. 
"AS is well known, a significant fraction of interviewees in the CPS fail to answer questions about 
wages (Lillard, Smith, and Welch (1986)). While the Census Bureau used a "hot deck" procedure to 
replace missing wages by  an allocated value in the 1979-92  outgoing rotation group files, it simply 
coded the wage as missing in the 1973-78  dual job holding supplements. Note also that, because of  a 
coding error in the CPS, it is impossible to identify most workers with allocated wages from 1989 to 
1992 (see Devine (1993)). This error is of little consequence for most of  our analysis as we focus on 
the 1979-88  period. LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS  1009 
the unionization rate were relatively stable or even increasing during the 19707s, 
they both fell precipitously during the 1980's.13 
2.2.  Weighted Kernel Density Estimation 
The density  estimates  reported in  this  paper  are obtained  by  adapting the 
kernel density estimator introduced by  Rosenblatt (1956) and Parzen (1962) to 
the case in which shample weights are attached to each observation. The kernel 
density  estimate  f,  of  a  univariate  density  f  based  on  a  random  sample 
Wl, .  .  . ,W,  of  size n, with weights el,.  .  .  ,en (Ziei  = I), is 
where h is the bandwidth and  K(.) is the kernel function. The critical issue in 
kernel density estimation is the choice of bandwidth.14 In this paper, we use the 
plug-in method of  Sheather and Jones (1991) as bandwidth selector since it does 
not exhibit the discretization problems associated with cross-validation methods 
(Silverman (1986)). All kernel density estimates presented here use the optimal 
bandwidth calculated with  Sheather and  Jones'  selector. The kernel  function 
used is Gaussian while the weights ei are the CPS sample weights multiplied by 
usual hours of work and normalized to sum to one. The optimal bandwidths for 
these "hours-weighted" density estimates range from 0.05 to 0.08, depending on 
the  range  of  the  support  and  the  sparsity  of  the  observations.  While  the 
estimated  densities become  less  smooth when  the  bandwidth becomes  small 
relative to the  optimal value, the general  shape of  the  densities remains  the 
same for a large range of  bandwidths. 
3. ESTIMATION  OF  COUNTERFACTUAL DENSITIES  OF  WAGES 
Our procedure for decomposing changes in the density of wages is a general- 
ization of  the familiar Oaxaca decomposition of  changes in means. Our decom- 
positions are based on simple counterfactual densities such as "what would the 
density of  wages have been  in  1988 if  workers' attributes, such as their  union 
status, had remained at their  1979 level?" One methodological contribution of 
13The relative  constancy of  the unionization  rate during the  1970's masks a decline in private 
sector unionization  that  was  more than  offset by  a  steep increase in  public  sector unionization. 
Public sector unionization then remained constant while private sector unionization declined sharply 
during the 1980's. See Freeman and Ichniowski (1988). 
14 The development  and comparison  of  optimal bandwidth  selectors  is  a  topic of  continuing 
research. Park and Turlach (1992) conducted simulation experiments to evaluate the performance of 
vari~s bandwidth selectors in terms of minimizing the Expected Integrated Square Error (EZSE = 
Ej(fL-f 1')  and the Expected Integrated Absolute Error (EIAE =Ejl  fi -f 1).  The plug-in method 
of  Sheather  and Jones  (1991) and the  bandwidth  factorized  smoothed cross-validation  of  Jones, 
Marron, and Park (1991) were shown to be the best selectors for densities with complex structures 
exhibiting more than one mode. 1010  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
this paper is to show that the estimation of  such counterfactual densities can be 
greatly simplified by  the judicious  choice of  a "reweighting"  function. Before 
formalizing our procedure, it  is useful to illustrate the spirit of  the procedure 
with an example. 
Figure 2 illustrates the simulated effect of changes in the level of unionization 
on  the  1988 density  of  real  log wages  for  a subset of  men with  12 years of 
education  and  10 to  30 years  of  experience. Figure  2a  shows  that  the  1988 
density (dotted line) can be decomposed into the weighted sum of  the densities 
of unionized and nonunionized workers. The density corresponding to the above 
counterfactual  is  obtained by  replacing the relative weight of  the densities of 
unionized workers vs. nonunionized workers of  1988 (0.35) by  that of  1979 (0.47). 
The effect of  changing the unionization level is then given, in Figure 2b, by  the 
difference between the 1988 density (dotted line) and the counterfactual density 
(solid line). It is apparent that, in general, this counterfactual density is to the 
right of  the original density, although the effect diminishes as one considers the 
most highly paid workers. 
The reweighting scheme is easy to conceptualize in this simple example. For 
the  cases  we  examine in  this  paper,  however,  a  more  rigorous  approach  is 
required. 
3.1. Notation 
In  order  to  discuss  our  estimation  procedure,  it  is  useful  to  view  each 
individual  observation  as  a vector  (w, z, t) made  up  of  a wage  w (which  is 
virtually  a continuous variable), a vector  z  of  individual  attributes (some of 
which are discrete variables), and a date t, which will take only two values in the 
following comparisons. Each individual observation belongs to a joint  distribu- 
tion F(w, z, t) of  wages, individual attributes, and dates. The joint distribution of 
wages and attributes at one point in time is the conditional distribution F(w, zlt). 
This distribution may also depend on distributional characteristics such as the 
/  ', 

union ': 

a)  Densities  from  the  union  and  b)  Weighted  sum  of  the  union and 
non-union  sector  in 1988  non-union  densities in 1988 
FIGURE 2.-An  illustration of the estimation of the effect of unions for male high school 
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minimum wage m,. The density of  wages  at one point  in  time, f,(w), can be 
written as the integral of  the density of wages conditional on a set of  individual 
attributes and on a date t,,  f(wlz,t,;  m,), over the distribution of  individual 
attributes F(zlt,)  at date t,: 
where  0, is  the domain  of  definition of  the individual  attributes.  Since the 
estimation  of  counterfactual  densities  involves  the  combination  of  different 
"datings,"  the  last  line  introduces  the  notation  that  accounts  for  these.  For 
example, while f(w; t,  = 88, t,  = 88, m,,)  represents the actual density of  wages 
in  1988, f(w; t,  = 88, t,  = 79, m,,)  represents the density of  wages  that would 
have prevailed in 1988 had the distribution of individual attributes remained as 
it was in 1979. 
Under the assumption that the 1988 structure of  wages, which is represented 
by  the conditional density f(w(z,  t,  = 88; m,,),  does not depend on the distribu- 
tion of  attributes, the hypothetical density f(w; t,  = 88, t,  = 79, m,,)  is 
where the "reweighting"  function  $,(z)  is defined as 
Calling  the counterfactual  density f(w; t,  = 88, t,  = 79, m,,)  the  "density  that 
would have prevailed if  individual attributes had remained at their 1979 level" is 
a misuse  of  language. This density should rather  be  called the "density  that 
would  have prevailed if  individual attributes had remained  at their  1979 level 
and workers had been paid according to the wage schedule observed in  1988," 
since we ignore the impact of  changes in the distribution of  z on the structure 
of  wages in general equilibrium. 
Equation (3) shows that the counterfactual  density is identical to the 1988 
density  except for the function  qlr,(z). The critical point in  the estimation  of 
counterfactual  densities is to recognize that they can be rewritten  in terms of 
actual densities with :he  help of  "reweighting"  functions. 
Once an estimate $,(z)  of this reweighting function is obtained (see below), it 
can be used to estimate the counterfactual density by  weighted kernel methods. 1012  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
Thus we have 
where S,,  is the set of  indices of  the 1988 sample. The difference between the 
actual 1988 density and this hypothetical density represents the effect of changes 
in  the  distribution  of  workers'  attributes.  The counterfactual  densities corre- 
sponding to the  four  factors discussed  earlier  are illustrated,  in  sequence, in 
Figures 4 and 5. Readers interested primarily in the empirical results may wish 
to skip immediately to Section 5, where we  expand on these and other results. 
In  the remainder  of  this  section, we  explain  in  detail how  to  estimate  the 
various counterfactual densities. This includes a discussion of  the economic and 
statistical  assumptions  required  to  make  the  estimation  in  a  nonparametric 
setting tractable. 
3.2. Effect of  Changes in  Unionization and Other Attributes 
The set of  individual attributes z used in the empirical analysis consist of  a 
dummy variable for the union status, u, and a vector x of  other attributes that 
includes experience, schooling, race, full-time or part-time status, SMSA dummy, 
3 occupational categories, and 19 industry categories. Given our focus on labor 
market  institutions,  it  is  useful  to  account  for  u  and  x  separately. First we 
construct the density of wages that would have prevailed if  unionization, but no 
other attribute, had remained at its 1979 level. Then we look at what would have 
happened if  both u and x had remained at their 1979 level. 
Since the distribution of  attributes F(zlt, = t) is the product of F(ulx, tul,  =t) 
and F(xlt, = t), equation (2) can be used to write the density of wages in 1988 as 
Under  the  assumption that  the  conditional  density  f(wlu, x, t,;  m,) does not 
depend on the unionization rate, the density that would have prevailed in 1988 if 
unionization, but none of the other attributes, had remained at its 1979 level can 
be written as a reweighted version of  the 1988 density: LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS 
where I+!IuIx(u,  x) is a reweighting function defined as 
~r(u = llx,  tulx  = 79)  ~r(u = OIx, tulx  = 79)
=u.  +[1  -ul. 
Pr(u = llx,  tulx  = 88)  Pr(u = OIx, tulx  = 88) ' 
where the latter part of  equation (8) is obtained by noting that, since the union 
status  u  takes  on  only  the  values  0 or 1, dF(ulx, tulx)  =u Pr(u = llx, tulx)  + 
[I -u]Pr(u = OIX,  tulx).15 
There are two commonly cited reasons why  the conditional density of  wages 
may depend on the unionization rate: nonrandom selection and general equilib- 
rium  (or  spillover) effects. While  several estimators  have  been  proposed  to 
handle the problem of  nonrandom  selection, little can be done about general 
equilibrium effects. This has led Lewis (1986) to conclude that it is impossible to 
measure  the  "true"  effect  of  unions  on  wage  dispersion. As  mentioned  in 
Section 3.1, we set the more modest task of  estimating the density of wages that 
would have prevailed if  unionization had remained at its 1979 level and workers 
had been paid according to the union and nonunion wage schedules observed in 
1988." 
An estimate of the reweighting function I+!IUlx(u,  x) can be obtained by  estimat- 
ing the conditional probability Pr(u = llx, tulx)  for tulx  = 79 and 88. A standard 
model for estimating this conditional probability is the probit model 
where  @(.)  is  the  cumulative normal  distribution  and  H(x) is  a  vector  of 
covariates that is a function of  x. In this paper, the vector H(x) is a low order 
polynomial in  x.17 If  x took on only a limited number of values, the best H(x) 
to use would be a full set of  dummy variables indicating each possible value of 
x. In this special case, the probit model would be equivalent to a "cell-by-cell" 
nonparametric model. 
To account for the role of  remaining attributes, we consider the density of 
wages that would have prevailed in 1988 if  the distribution of both  u and x had 
15 In  the  example presented  in  Figure  2,  where  x  is fixed, the reweighting function  becomes 
h(u)  =Pr(u = lit, = 79)/Pr(u  = lit, = 88) if  u = 1, and @Ju) = Pr(u = Olt,  = 79)/Pr(u  =Olt,  = 88) 
if  u =0.  Thus,  &(u)  is  equal  to 0.47/0.35  for  union  workers,  and  to  0.53/0.65  for  nonunion 
workers. 
161n theory, we may either overstate or understate the true effect of  unions by  ignoring selection 
issues and general equilibrium effects. The results of Card (1996) suggest that we probably overstate 
the effect. 
he vector H(x)actually consists of  a gender dummy fully interacted with fifteen dummies for 
experience-education groups, a quartic in experience, years of  education, experience and education 
interacted,  three  region  dummies,  eighteen  industry  dummies,  two  occupation  dummies,  and 
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remained as in  1979: 
where  rG;,(x>  =dF(xltx= 79)/dF(xltx = 88). Applying Bayes' rule, this ratio can 
be written as 
The probability of  being in period  t, given individual attributes x, can once 
again be estimated using a probit model 
where a(.) and  H(x) are as defined above. Given that we view the two dates 
as  the  two  possible  events  in  the date space,  the  unconditional  probability 
Prob(t, = 79) is equal to the weighted number of observations in 1979 divided by 
the weighted number of  observations in both 1979 and 1988. The unconditional 
probability Prob(t, = 88) is defined similarly. It is thus straightforward to com- 
pute an estimate &(x) using equations (11) and (12). 
3.3.  Effect of  Changes in the Minimum Wage 
Another potential explanation for the increase  in wage  inequality between 
1979 and 1988 is the 27 percent decline in the real value of  the minimum wage. 
To evaluate the impact of  this  decline, we wish  to construct  a counterfactual 
density of wages in 1988 obtained by  raising the minimum wage back to its 1979 
level. Most of  the research on the effects of  raising the value of  the minimum 
wage has focused on its potential disemployment effect.ls Although the potential 
distributional consequences of  the minimum wage have long been noted (Stigler 
(1946)), they have received comparatively less attention and there is not estab- 
lished consensus on the empirical strategy for estimating these effects.19 
Our analysis thus begins with a set of  simple economic assumptions that are 
easy to implement in a nonparametric setting. For robustness, we also consider a 
few alternative assumptions and show that these alternative assumptions tend to 
18 See Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) and Card and Krueger (1995) for surveys of  this research. 
19Gramlich (1976) is an important early paper on this topic. More recently, the subject has been 
considered  by  Horrigan  and  Mincy  (19931,  Machin  and Manning (1994), and Card  and Krueger 
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magnify the equalizing effect of the minimum wage. Our primary assumptions 
are therefore  conservative  in  the sense of  minimizing the effect  (in  absolute 
value) of  a hypothetical  increase  in the minimum wage on measures  of  wage 
dispersion  such  as  the  variance  of  log  wages.  These  assumptions  are  the 
following. 
ASSUMPTION 1: The minimum wage has no spillover effects on the distribution of 
wages above the minimum wage. For  any two values m, and  m, (m, I m,) of  the 
minimum  wage,  this  implies  that  the  conditional  densities f(wlz,t,;  m,)  and 
f(wIz, t,;  m,) are  the same for  wages above the highest value of  the minimum wage 
(m,): 
where  I(.) is  an  indicator function  that takes on  the  value  1 if the  condition in 
parentheses  is  satisfied, and  0 otherwise. Thus whenever  [l -I(w Iml)] = 1, the 
wage  w is above the minimum wage. 
Increasing the minimum wage  should have  positive spillover effects  on the 
wage  of  skilled workers-earning  more than  the minimum-if  these workers 
were substitutes for minimum wage workers.20 There is indeed evidence of small 
spillover  effects  of  the  minimum  wage  on  wages  just  above  the  minimum 
(Grossman (1983),Katz and Krueger (1992),Card and Krueger (1994)).On the 
other  hand,  allowing  for  positive  spillover  effects  on wages  just  above  the 
minimum wage-but  below the mean and median-would  magnify the equaliz- 
ing effect of the minimum wage. Assumption 1 is thus conservative. 
In  order to simulate  a complete counterfactual  density,  assumptions about 
wages below the minimum wage have to be made. Wages observed below the 
minimum wage are the result of  either noncoverage or noncompliance. Thus, 
our second primary assumption guarantees that, if  the minimum wage in 1988 
had remained at its 1979  level, then the distribution of  1988  wages below the 
1979 minimum wage would have been similar to that of  1979, after adjusting for 
differences in the composition of the labor force. 
ASSUMPTION 2: The shape of  the conditional density of  real wages at or below the 
minimum wage  only depends on the (real) value of  the minimum wage. Therefore, 
for  two years,  to and  t,, and  two  values  of  the  minimum wage,  m, and  m, 
(m, I  m,), the shape of  the conditional density f(w lz,  to;  m,) that would prevail  at 
to if m, were  raised  to m, is proportional to the shape  of  the conditional density 
f(wlz, t,;  m,) for  wages  at or below the highest  value of  the minimum wage  (m,). 
'O~he  assumption  that there is no substitution possible between  these two types of  workers is 
much  stronger  than  the  assumption  of  constant  elasticity of  substitution of  Bound  and Johnson 
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This implies that, for wages at or below the value of the 1979 minimum wage, 
that is for  w such that  I(w <m,,)  = 1, the conditional density  of  wages that 
would prevail in 1988 if  the minimum wage were raised back to its 1979 level is 
proportional to the conditional density of wages in 1979: 
where qW(z,  m,,)  is a reweighting function to be specified below. 
A variation on this assumption is that raising the minimum wage back to its 
1979 level would not affect  the part of  the 1988 distribution below the lower 
1988 minimum wage. Assumption 2 would still hold, however, for wages between 
the 1988 and the 1979 values of the minimum wage.21  A comparison of Panel (a) 
and (c) of Appendix Table A2 indicates that, empirically, the effect of increasing 
the minimum wage is larger under this alternative assumption. 
ASSUMPTION 3:  The minimum wage has no effects on employment probabilities. 
This  assumption is  dictated  by  an emerging consensus  that  disemployment 
effects  of  increases in the minimum wage are relatively small (Brown, Gilroy, 
and Kohen (1982), Card and Krueger (1995)). Moreover, allowing for disemploy- 
ment  effects  would  cause  some attrition  in  the lower  tail  of  the distribution 
which would magnify the equalizing effect of the minimum wage.22 
How we estimate the effect of the minimum wage under Assumptions 1to 3 is 
more easily described with a picture. Consider the densities of wages displayed 
for a relatively homogeneous  group of  workers in  1979 (Figure 3a) and 1988 
(Figure 3b).23  The vertical lines represent the real value of the minimum wage in 
1979. Our simple estimator consists of replacing the section of the 1988 density 
at or below the 1979 minimum wage by  the corresponding section of  the 1979 
density. Note that the section imputed from the 1979 density has to be scaled 
appropriately to make sure that the overall density still integrates to one. The 
21Another possible assumption considered by Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1992) is that all 
workers earning between the 1979 and 1988 minima would earn the 1979 minimum, while the wage 
of  workers  earning  less  than the  1988 minimum  would  increase  in  the same proportion as the 
minimum  wage. Our alternative  to Assumption 2 is  clearly more conservative  since the wage of 
workers earning less than the 1988 minimum does not change, while some workers earning between 
the 1988 and 1979 minima end up earning less than the 1979 minimum when we impute the 1979 
distribution. Interestingly,  Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1992) also assume no disemployment 
effects and no spillover effects. 
22 In Appendix Table A2, we show that the effect of the minimum wage is indeed larger when we 
allow for a disemployment elasticity of 0.15 (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982)). Similar results would 
be obtained if  the minimum wage had no effects  on the number of  workers employed but had a 
negative effect on the number of hours worked by  minimum wage workers. 
23~he densities in Figure 3 were estimated for women with 12 years of education or less, and with 
less than 20 years of experience. The apparent spillover effect of the minimum wage in Figure 4c is 
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a)  Density  Estimate  of Real  Log  Wages  in 1988 
b)  Density  Estimate  of Real Log  Wages  in 1979 
c)  Density  Estimate  of Real  Log  Wages  in 1988 
Adjusted  for -1979's Minimum  Wage 
FIGURE  illustration of  the estimation of the effect of the minimum wage for 3.-An 
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resulting 1988 density with the minimum wage at its 1979 level is represented in 
Figure 3c. The  effect  of  the  minimum wage  on  the  density  of  wages  is  the 
difference between Figure 3a and 3c. 
More formally, we  construct  a  1988 conditional density with  the minimum 
wage at its 1979 value by  selecting the part of  the 1988 density above m,,  and 
the part of  the 1979 density at or below m,,  with an indicator function. We also 
premultiply the 1979 density by  a reweighting function $,(z,  m,,)  to make sure 
the overall density integrates to one: 
where 
To obtain the effect of the minimum wage on the overall distribution of wages 
in 1988, it is necessary to integrate the conditional density in equation (15) over 
the distribution of  attributes: 
where $,(z,  m,,)  is as defined in equation (16), and where 
After applying Bayes' rule, the product of  the two reweighting functions simpli- 
fies to 
The probability of being at date t, given certain individual attributes and a wage 
below the 1979 minimum wage, can be estimated using a probit model 
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In practice, this probit model is estimated by pooling observations from the 1979 
and  1988 samples  that  have  real  wages  smaller  or equal  to  the  1979 real 
minimum wage.24 
3.4.  Effect of  Changes in Supply and Demand 
The effects that we have described to this point have been primarily "institu- 
tional."  They have ignored the supply and demand con.ditions that  are at the 
heart of many discussions on the causes of  changes in the wage structure. One 
difficulty with supply and demand considerations is that they do not readily fit 
into our distributional framework. Standard measures of supply and demand are 
useful for understanding wage dispersion between skill categories of  workers, 
but they are not well suited for understanding  residual wage dispersion within 
these categories. 
Despite this caveat, we incorporate standard measures of  supply and demand 
into our framework for two reasons. First, we wish to compare our findings on 
the relative importance of institutional factors with the rest of the literature that 
has focused heavily on supply and demand. We also want to ensure that we are 
not overstating the importance of  institutional  factors by  ignoring supply and 
demand considerations. 
The estimation of  the effect of  supply and demand on the structure of wages 
has been well described by  Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy 
(1992), among others. We follow directly the estimation procedure proposed by 
Bound and Johnson as we are analyzing the same CPS data over the same time 
period.  Accordingly, we  divide  the  workforce  into  32  experience-education- 
gender cells and construct measures of  supply (N,,) and demand (Dj,) for each 
cell j. 
Under the assumption that the production function in  each industry is  CES 
(constant  elasticity of  substitution), linear  regression methods can be used  to 
estimate the shift,  A$,  in  the mean  cell wage  due to changes in  supply and 
demand. The regression  is  estimated  in  second differences (1979-88  change 
minus 1973-79  change) to eliminate cell-specific linear trends due, for example, 
to technological change. The supply variable N,, is defined as the share of  the 
total  workforce  in  cell  j.  The  demand  variable  Dj,  is  a  "fixed-coefficient 
manpower requirements index"  that  reflects between-sector  shifts in  relative 
labor  demands.25  Two  vectors  of  distributional  characteristics  d, = 
24 In the estimation, we use the log of $3.00 instead of  the minimum wage of  $2.90 as the value of 
in,,  (in  1979 dollars). This choice is  driven by  the abnormal concentration  of  workers at  $3.00 in 
1979 which  suggests either  small  spillover  effects  of  the  minimum  wage  or  misreporting. The 
sensitivity of  our results to this choice is investigated in Appendix Table A2. 
25~ollowing Bound and Johnson (19921, we use a measure of  demand shifts that nets-out supply 
shifts. See equations (A10) to (A12) in the Appendix to their  paper. Unlike Bound and Johnson, 
however, we do not constrain  N,, and  Dj, to have equal and opposite coefficients, as predicted by 
the theory. We just  let  N,, and Dj, explain as much as they can of  changes in relative wages. The 
details of the construction of the supply and demand indices are available from the authors upon 
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(In D,,,,..  . ,ln D,,,,)  and  n,  = (In N,,,, ...,ln N,,,,)  summarize supply  and  de- 
mand conditions. Expanding the list of  distributional characteristics to include 
dl  and  n,,  the  conditional  density  of  wages  in  1988  becomes  f(wlz,t, = 
88;  m,,,  d,,,  n,,).  The conditional density of  wages that would have prevailed if 
supply and  demand  conditions had  remained  at  their  1979 level thus can be 
written as 
The overall effect of  supply and demand shocks is the difference between the 
1988  density  of  wages  and  the  hypothetical  density obtained  by  integrating 
equation (21)  over the distribution of  individual attributes z: 
= /f(w - A$,lz,  t, = 88;  m,,,  d,,,  n,,)  dF(zltz  = 88). 
4.  DECOMPOSITION  OF  CHANGES  IN  DENSITIES 
4.1.  Sequential Decomposition 
Our main analysis of  changes in the density of  wages between 1979 and 1988 
is based on the following sequential decomposition: 
where we have omitted the distributional factors d,,  and n,,  in the first three 
components of  the decomposition to simplify the notation. The five components 
of  equation  (23) represent  the  "effect"  of  the minimum  wage, unionization, 
other attributes, supply and demand, and residual factors, respectively. 
The decomposition in equation (23)is sequential to ensure that the change in 
densities between 1979 and 1988 is exactly equal to the sum of  the components 
corresponding to the factors we analyze. One drawback of  sequential decompo- LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS  1021 
sitions is that the "effect"  of  a given factor generally depends on the order of 
the decomposition. We will  thus consider a decomposition in reverse order to 
ensure that we are not overstating the impact of  labor market institutions-the 
minimum wage and unions-by  considering them first. We next show how the 
estimation  methods developed in  Section 3 can  be  adapted  to  estimate  the 
various elements of  decomposition (23). 
4.2.  Decomposition of  Densities with  Weighted Kernel Estimators 
To simplify  the  notation,  we  use  a  subscript  i  to  label  the  reweighting 
functions corresponding to observation i. The weighted kernel density estimates 
of  all counterfactual  densities considered in  Section 3 are special cases of the 
following equation: 
where T,  denotes the weighting function, wi denotes the wage of interest (either 
w, = w or wi = U: -Awl, and S is the set of  indices of  the appropriate sample. 
Estimates of  the counterfactual  densities in decomposition (23) are obtained 
by  substituting  in  equation  (24)  combinations  of  the  reweighting  functions 
described in Section 3. These combinations of  reweighting functions are summa- 
rized  in  Table  11. The first panel  of  Table I1  displays the T  functions corre- 
sponding to the sequential decomposition (23). For example, the weights used to 
estimate  the  density  f(w; t,  = 88, t,,,  = 79, t,  = 79; m,,),  which  account  for 
changes in  the minimum wage, in the unionization rate, and in other individual 
attributes, are displayed in column 3 of  this first panel. The estimated density is 
obtained by  setting T to  $I+!JuIx$,  for the 1979 observations at or below the 1979 
minimum  wage,  and  to  $,lx~x  for  the  1988  observations  above  the  1979 
minimum, and to zero for  1988 observations at or below the  1979 minimum. 
This product  of  reweighting functions is obtained by  sequentially applying the 
reweighting  function  associated  with  the  minimum  wage  (19),  the  function 
associated with unionization (8), and that of  other attributes (11hZ6 
Note that the reweighting function associated with changes in the minimum 
wage, I),  is replaced by  $' when supply and demand factors are also taken into 
account: 
where  w =  w  in  1979  and  w = w -Aw,  in  1988. This  alternative  weighting 
scheme is used since only workers whose 1988 wage would have been below the 
26~quation (10) provides a formal example of  how the reweighting function associated with two 
factors (unionization and other attributes) can be written as the product of the reweighting functions 
associated with each individual factor ($z(x) and  cC;,.(u, x)). -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
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TABLE I1 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Factors held at their 1979 level 
Primary Order:  Minimum wage  (1) + Unions  (2) + Individual  (3) + Supply 
Attributes  and Demand 
Counterfactual densities 
f(~;t,,f,~.,t,,m,,d,,n,)tUl.= 88, t,=  88  tUl,=  79, t,=  88  tUl,=  79, 1,-  79  tUl,=  79, t,=  79 
Year  Sample  m79,ma8,na8  m79, dm,  naa  m79,dsa3naa  m793  d793 "79 
1979  w 5m79  @  **u 1. **u  IX *X  *'*UIX*X 
0 1988  w ~m~~  0  0  -
-
w>m79  1  *UlX  *UlX  *x 

1988  w - Ahjj i;. m7,  - - - 0 

w - Ahj,  > m7,  *UlX  *x 

Reverse Order:  Supply and  (1) + Individual  (2) + Unions  (3) + Minimum 
Demand  Attributes  Wage 
Counterfactual densities 
f(~;f,,t,~.,t,,m,,d,,n,)  txl.= 88, tu=88  tzIu=  79, t,=  88  t,lu=79,tu=79  79.tu=79 
Year  Sample  maa,d79,n79  maa,d79,n79  ma,, d793n79  m79,d79,n79 
1979  w <m7,  0  0  0  *'*XlU*U 

1988  w <m7,  - - - -

w>m79 

1988  w - Ahjj i;. m7,  1  *XI,  *XIU*U  0 

w - dhjj > m7,  1  *xlu  *XI,  *u  *XI,  *u 
Note:  The we~ghting  functions $,  $,,  $',  and 6, are defined by equations (19), (81, (ll), (25), (27), and (261, 
respectively. 
1979 minimum wage, if  supply and demand conditions had remained  at their 
1979 level, should be affected by  switching the minimum wage back to its 1979 
level. 
To perform the sequential decomposition in reverse order, different weighting 
functions  are used;  they  are displayed in  the second panel  of  Table  11.  The 
reweighting  functions  GXI, and  $,  are introduced  since  the  effect  of  other 
individual  attributes  is  considered  before  the  effect  of  unions.  These  two 
reweighting functions are derived by  applying the procedure described in  Sec- 
tion 3.2  in reverse order. For example, $,(u)  is given by 
The estimate  $,(u)  is  thus a simple function of  the unionization rates in  1979 
and 1988. 
Since  F(z)  =  F(u,  x)  =  F(ulx)F(x)=  F(xlu)F(u),  and since the reweighting 
function  GZ(z)is the ratio dF(zlt, = 79)/dF(zlt, = 881, it can be written either 
as the product of  $ulx(u,  x)  and  $x(x),or as the product of $xlu(u,  x)  and  $,(u). 
This property can be used to estimate  $x,u(~, X)as 1023  LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS 
Qne impor;tant advaniage of  this  estimator  is  that  it  constrains  the products 
t,bulx(u, x)  t,bx(x) and  t,bxlu(u,  x)  t,bu(u) to be equal. As a consequence, the esti- 
mate of  the density that would have prevailed if  both  unionization and other 
attributes  had  remained  at  their  1979 level  is  invariant  to the  order  of  the 
decomposition. This implies that residual changes in densities are also invariant 
to the order of  the decomposition. 
5. ACCOUNTING  FOR  CHANGES  IN  THE  DENSITY  OF  WAGES  1979-88 
5.1.  Estimated Effects of  Explanatoiy Factors on the Density of  Wages 
We  plot  the weighted  kernel  estimates  of  the  counterfactual  densities  in 
decomposition (23) in Figure 4 for men and in  Figure 5 for women. The actual 
1988 (solid line) and 1979 (dotted line) densities are superimposed in panel (a) 
of  both figures. This shows the raw differences to be explained. For each of  the 
explanatory factors  considered,  we  use  the  following convention: we  report 
the density obtained by  holding the factor at its 1988 value with a solid line, and 
the density obtained by  holding the factor at its 1979 value with a dotted line. 
The difference between the two lines represents the effect of  changes in  the 
explanatory factor on the density of  wages. 
The solid line in  Figure 4b  is  the  1988 density of  wages  f(w; t,  = 88, t, = 
88, ma,) while the dotted line represents f(w; t,  = 88, t,  = 88,m,,).The influ- 
ence of  the minimum wage on the distribution of wages is clearly seen. There is 
more mass at the bottom of  the wage distribution in 1988 (at and slightly above 
two dollars (1979$)) than if  the minimum wage had remained at its 1979 level. 
This is true for both men and women (Figure 5b). 
The estimated densities with the unionization rate at its 1979 and 1988 level 
for men and women are presented  in Figures 4c and 5c respectively. Figure 4c 
shows that changes in unionization had a substantial effect on the distribution of 
men's wages. The decline in unionization between 1979 and 1988 contributed to 
the decline of the "middle" of the distribution and the fattening of  the lower tail 
of  the distribution. 
The estimated  densities  corresponding  to  changes  in  individual  attributes 
other  than  unionization  are shown  in  Figure  4d  for  men  and  Figure  5d  for 
women. The densities with the 1979 distribution of  attributes, f(w; t,  = 88,tul,= 
79, t,  = 79, m,,)  (dotted line), qualitatively look like translations  to the left of 
the densities with the  1988 distribution of  attributes (solid line). This suggests 
there  was  an  upgrade  in  attributes  or  "skills"  between  1979 and  1988. It  is 
consistent with secular increases in the average number of years of  schooling of 
workers. 
Using  the same convention as for  the other  factors, the  density  estimates 
corresponding to changes in supply and demand are reported in Figure 4e for 
men  and  in  Figure  5e  for  women.  Finally,  panel  (f)  of  Figures  4  and  5 
superimposes the counterfactual  density (solid line) that  accounts for all  four 
factors, and the 1979 density (dotted line). Discrepancies between the two lines 
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5.2. Changes in Densities 
A clearer illustration of the contribution of  the different explanatory factors is 
obtained by  looking at the changes in densities that cannot be explained after 
accounting for the effect of  each specific factor. These changes in densities are 
obtained by  plotting the difference between each counterfactual density and the 
1979 density. When viewed this way, the goal of  the decomposition exercise is to 
get a "flat line" once all the factors have been accounted for. 
Looking explicitly  at  the  difference  between  two  densities  also  provides a 
complete description of  changes in  the distribution  of  wages.  For example, a 
mean-preserving spread  of  the  distribution  could result  in  a positive  density 
difference in the tails of  the distribution and in  a negative density difference in 
the "middle"  of  the distribution. By  contrast, measures like the variance, the 
10-90  differential, or the Gini coefficient only summarize differences between 
two distributions with a single number. When looked at in isolation, they fail to 
indicate the region of  the wage distribution in which most of  the changes are 
occurring. Note also that the difference between the 1979 and the 1988 densities 
is  not  very  smooth,  which  reduces  its  "visual  impact."  The  differences  in 
densities  presented  in  Figures  6 and  7 were  thus  further  smoothed  using  a 
Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of  0.07. 
The changes in densities are displayed in Figure 6 for men and in Figure 7 for 
women. The vertical line marks the location of  the 1979 minimum wage. Figures 
6a and 7a display our estimates of  the difference between the density of  wages 
in 1988 and 1979. One of  the most important feature of  the difference between 
the two periods is the additional mass in the 1988 distribution at wages below 
the 1979 minimum. In Figures 6b and 7b, we  remove changes associated with 
the fall in the minimum wage. For men, the difference between the two densities 
at values below the 1979 minimum falls considerably, the tall "hump" of  Figure 
6a shifts to the right in Figure 6b. The results are even more striking for women. 
As Figure 7b makes clear, the single most  important  cause of  changes in  the 
distribution of women's wages was the decline in the minimum wage. As it turns 
out,  there  is  considerable  difference  between  the  two  densities  in  the  area 
immediately to the right of  the 1979 minimum. This indicates the possibility of 
additional spillover effects of  minimum wage legislation. 
Next we remove changes attributable to changes in unionization in Figures 6c 
and 7c. In the case of  men, the 39 percent  decrease  in  the unionization rate 
(Table I) played a significant role in explaining the clear collapse of  the middle 
of  the distribution of  wages. This is easily explained by  the fact that relatively 
unskilled workers benefit the most from unionization which moves them toward 
the "middle"  of  the wage distribution. As unionization declines, these workers 
slide back toward the lower tail of  the distribution. By  contrast, a comparison of 
Figures 7b and 7c indicates that changes in unionization had a negligible effect 
on the distribution of  women's wages. This result is consistent with the fact that 
the unionization rate did not decline very much for women (Table I) and that LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS 
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FIGURE 6.-Smoothed  differences between the 1988 density adjusted for indicated factors 
and the 1979 density for men. 
unions generally have little impact on women's wage  inequality (see Lemieux 
(1993)). 
Over the period, the samples grew slightly older, and slightly more educated. 
The effects of  this change can be seen in Figures 6d  and 7d. While changes in 
the distribution of  individual attributes almost completely explain the difference 
between  the  two  densities  in  the  upper  tail,  they  exacerbate  the  difference 
between  the  two  densities  in  the lower  tail.  As  shown  in  Figure  6e  and  7e, 
changes in supply and demand reduce the remaining difference between the two 1028  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
a)  Actual  Difference  d)  Individual Attributes  and  c) 
b)  Minimum  Wage  e)  Supply  and  Demand  and  d) 
c)  Unionization Level and  b) 
FIGURE 7.-Smoothed  differences between the 1988 density adjusted for indicated factors 
and the 1979 density for women. 
densities everywhere. These figures show that  supply and demand  conditions 
affected workers in ways that are consistent with the well documented increase 
in  returns to skill. For both men and women, changes in  supply and demand 
conditions contributed  to a fattening  of  the  lower and upper  tails  and to a 
decline  of  the  "middle"  of  the  distribution.  Figures  6e  and  7e  show  the 
remaining unexplained differences. LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS  1029 
5.3.  Quantitatwe Measures 
By  way  of  comparison with  the  rest  of  the literature  and to provide some 
numerical values for the graphical changes documented in the previous subsec- 
tions, it is useful to compute a few summary measures, such as wage differentials 
and  Gini  coefficients, as  well  as  a  measure  of  the  divergence between  the 
densities.  Computing  these  measures  is  straightforward  once  the  density  of 
wages has been estimated. 
For example, the 10th percentile of  the estimated density of  wages for 1988, 
w,,, is such that 
while the 90th percentile, w,,, is such that 
since  w 2 0.  The  10-90  wage  differential  is  simply  w,, -w,,.  The  1979-88 
change in the 10-90 wage differential is obtained by  computing similar statistics 
from the estimated density for 1979. 
It is also easy to derive other inequality measures. Among the most widely 
used are Theil's entropy coefficient and the Gini coefficient. gt  LI = ezp(w) be 
the real wage, and denote the density of  its distribution by  f,,(u)  =f,,(w)/u. 
Theil's entropy coefficient is the negative of  the expectation of  the logarithm of 
the 1988 density 
The Lorenz curve is another device commonly used to measure inequality. It 
is  the locus  of  points with  the  cumulative population  share  on  the  abscissa, 
F(u) = jtf(()d(,  and  the  cumulative wage  share,  F,(u),  which  is  the  first 
moment distribution 
on the ordinate. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of  the area enclosed by  the 
Lorenz curve and the diagonal line to the total area below the diagonal. It thus 
takes on a minimum value of  zero (perfect  equality) when  the Lorenz curve 
coincides with the diagonal, and a maximum value of  one (perfect inequality). 
27 For example, if  the distribution is normal with mean  iu, and variance  (r2,it is easily shown that 
this measure of inequality depends only on the variance:  T=  $ln2~eu~. 1030 	 J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
For the estimated density of wages for 1988, the Gini coefficient is given by 
One drawback of these summary measures is that they provide little informa- 
tion  on the different  shapes  of  two  distributions.  Given  our  focus on what 
happens where  in  the distribution,  it  is  useful  to provide  a measure  of  the 
divergence between the distributions that relates  more directly to the density 
differences presented  in  Figures 6 and  7.  We  use  the statistical measure  of 
"distance"  or  "divergence"  between  two  densities  fl and  f2  considered  by 
Kullback and Leibler (1951):~~ 
(33) 	 J12(w) = lm[fl(w)  -f2(w)lln- 
f1(w) 
dw. 
0  f,(w) 
Table I11  presents  our decomposition results for various measures  of  wage 
dispersion  and  for  Kullback-Leibler  measure  of  divergence.  In  parentheses 
underneath  each  estimate,  we  present  the  percentage  of  the  total  change 
explained by  each specific factor. Starting with the measures of wage dispersion 
for men, we note that the effect of the minimum wage is greatest on measures 
pertaining  to the  lower part  of  the  distribution.  This  is  consistent  with  the 
graphical results presented earlier. The minimum wage explains 25  percent  of 
the change in  the  10-90  differential, 66 percent  of  the change in  the 10-50 
differential, and 49 percent of the change in the 5-95  differential. The minimum 
wage thus seems to explain why  changes in wage inequality during the 1980's 
came mostly  from longer  tails  at the low  end of  the distribution  (Buchinsky 
(1994)). The minimum wage on the other hand, explains very little of the change 
in  the 50-90  or the 25-75  differential. Overall, it  explains 25  percent  of  the 
change in the standard deviation of log wages. 
The visually apparent contribution of  unions to the declining "middle"  of  the 
distribution of  men's wages translates into a 14 percent change in the standard 
deviation of  log wages. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to the results 
of  both  Card  (1996)  and  Freeman  (1993).  Changes  in  the  distribution  of 
individual attributes, likewise, explain  about  14 percent  of  the change in the 
standard deviation. Supply and demand effects are also quite important for men. 
These effects explain between  20  and  30 percent  of  changes in  the standard 
deviation and in the 10-90  and 25-75  wage differentials. 
It is interesting to note that the various factors have quite different effects on 
changes in  Theil's coefficient versus changes in  the Gini coefficient for men. 
Changes in individual attributes explain the greatest proportion of the change in 
Theil's  coefficient over the period-62  percent. On the other hand, the most 
important  factor  in  explaining changes in  the Gini  coefficient  is  changes in 
28 The Kullback-Leibler divergence measure is written in terms of  Shannon's measure of  informa-
tion that is used  to discriminate between the two statistical  populations. - - -- 
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TABLE 111 
Effect of: 
Total  Minimum  Individuala  Supply &  Unexplainedb 
Statistic  Change  Wage  Unions  Attributes  Demand  Change 
p~ 

MEN: 
Standard  0.072  0.018  0.010  0.010  0.016  0.017 
DeviationC  (24.8)  (14.3)  (14.3)  (22.3)  (24.4) 
10-90d  0.195  0.049  0.021  0.040  0.040  0.044 
(25.3)  (10.7)  (20.7)  (20.7)  (22.6) 
10-50  0.076  0.050  -0.019  0.038  0.008  -0.001 
(65.7)  (- 25.6)  (49.7)  (10.9)  (-0.7) 
50-90  0.119  -0.000  0.040  0.003  0.032  0.045 
(-0.4)  (33.7)  (2.3)  (27.0)  (37.5) 
25-75  0.109  -0.001  0.031  -0.000  0.027  0.051 
(- 0.6)  (28.7)  (-0.0)  (24.9)  (47.1) 
5-95  0.290  0.141  0.025  0.051  0.046  0.027 
(48.6)  (8.7)  (17.5)  (15.8)  (9.4) 
Theil's  0.113  0.038  0.003  0.070  0.026  -0.025 
Coefficient  (34.0)  (3.0)  (61.6)  (23.4)  (-22.2) 
Gini  0.041  0.005  0.009  0.003  0.01  1  0.013 
Coefficient  (11.3)  (21.1)  (7.9)  (26.6)  (33.0) 
Kullback- 0.092  0.053  0.013  -0.005  0.012  0.020 
Leibler 'J'e  (57.5)  (13.9)  (-5.9)  (12.8)  (21  $6) 
WOMEN: 
Standard  0.090  0.027  0.003  0.023  0.017  0.019 
DeviationC  (30.2)  (3.2)  (25.9)  (19.3)  (21.2) 
10-9od  0.328  0.148  0.004  0.084  0.036  0.056 
(45.1)  (1.3)  (25.6)  (11.1)  (16.9) 
10-50  0.243  0.150  -0.010  0.078  -0.011  0.036 
(61.7)  (-4.1)  (32.1)  (- 4.5)  (14.8) 
50-90  0.085  -0.002  0.014  0.006  0.047  0.020 
(- 2.5)  (16.9)  (7.0)  (55.6)  (23.0) 
25-75  0.146  0.011  0.001  0.049  0.027  0.058 
(7.4)  (0.7)  (33.7)  (18.7)  (39.5) 
5-95  0.380  0.169  0.008  0.083  0.053  0.067 
(44.3)  (2.2)  (21.9)  (14.0)  (17.6) 
Theil's  0.302  0.078  -0.008  0.148  0.021  0.063 
Coefficient  (25.9)  (-2.8)  (48.9)  (6.8)  (21.0) 
Gini  0.049  0.011  0.003  0.012  0.013  0.011 
Coefficient  (23.3)  (5.1)  (23.7)  (25.7)  (22.2) 
Kullback- 0.250  0.180  -0.005  0.047  0.015  0.013 
Leibler 'J'e  (71.8)  (- 1.8)  (18.8)  (6.0)  (5.2) 
Note:  Percent of total variation  explained in parenthesis. 
"he  individual attributes are experience, experience squared, education, SMSA, marital status, full-time or part-time, 3 
occupational and 19 industry classes. 
h'* Unexplained" is the residual  not accounted for by all other factors. See text for further explanation. 
'Standard  deviation of log wage distribution. 
*~ifference between the 90th and the 10th percentiles of the log wage distribution. The 10-50,  50-90,  25-75,  and 5-95 
statistics are defined similarly. 
'Kullback  and Leibler's .I' statistic is a measure of divergence between two distributions f, and f2: 
The effect of an explanatory  factor  Indicates  how  much  of  the  divergence between  the  1988  and the  1979 density is 
explained by replacing the 1988 density by the corresponding counterfactual  density. 1032  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
supply and demand which account for 27 percent of  the total. These differences 
reflect  the  fact  that  the  Gini  coefficient  puts  relatively  more weight  on  the 
middle of  the distribution while Theil's coefficient emphasizes the tails. 
The second half  of  Table I11  displays a similar  decomposition for women. 
Most  of  the  patterns  are  similar  although,  not  surprisingly,  changes  in  the 
unionization rate explain less of the change in wage dispersion than they do for 
men. By  contrast, the effect of  changes in the minimum wage on changes in the 
standard deviation of  log wages is larger (30 percent) for women than for men 
(25 percent). In addition, changes in individual attributes generally have a more 
important effect than changes in supply and demand, which is not true for men. 
Note also that the minimum wage has a large effect on both changes in the Gini 
and Theil's coefficient. The effect of  the minimum wage on the Gini coefficient 
is larger  for women than  for men  since  the minimum wage  is  closer to the 
middle of  the distribution of women's wages. 
In terms of  the Kullback-Leibler measure of  divergence, the most important 
explanatory factor is the minimum wage. For both men and women, changes in 
the minimum wage explain over a half  of  the divergence between the 1979 and 
1988 distributions. This measure confirms the visual impression that the mini- 
mum  wage  is  the most  important factor  in  the  change in the distribution  of 
wages between  1979 and  1988. It captures well  the fact that, for women, the 
density difference adjusted for the minimum wage (Figure 7b) is much closer to 
a  flat  line  than  the  unadjusted  difference  (Figure  7a).  This  measure  also 
confirms the visual impression that the explanatory success of  our procedure is 
greater for women than for men. The changes in densities unexplained by  the 
four factors we consider amount to 22 percent of the Kullback-Leibler measure 
for men, and to 5 percent for women. 
5.4. Changes in Wage Dispersion Between and  Within Skill Groups 
In their influential survey, Levy  and  Murnane (1992) note  that  there  is  an 
emerging consensus that changes in supply and demand factors are the leading 
explanation for changes in wage dispersion between  "skill  groups" defined by 
observable characteristics, such as age and education. They also note, however, 
the absence of  such a consensus on the sources of  changes in wage dispersion 
within workers belonging to the same skill group. Unlike supply and demand 
considerations,  the  two  "institutional"  explanations  we  consider-minimum 
wages  and  unionization-have  clear  and  measurable  impacts  on  both  the 
dispersion  of  wages  between  and  within  different  groups  of  workers.  This 
suggests that institutional factors might be the leading explanation for changes 
in wage dispersion within skill groups.29  To address this issue, we follow Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and estimate standard wage regressions to decom- 
29~ard (1996) and Freeman (1993) both show that de-unionization contributed to the increase in 
within-group inequality over the 1980's. LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS  1033 
pose wage dispersion between and within skill groups.30  Predicted wages from 
these regressions are used to compute "between"  measures of wage dispersion 
while residuals are used to compute "within"  measures. 
In  Table IV, we  report our estimates  of  the between- and within-standard 
deviation for each of  the reweighted samples used in our main decomp~sition.~~ 
We also report some education and experience wage differentials which are the 
underlying components of  measures of wage dispersion between skill groups. 
As expected, changes in  supply and demand factors are the most important 
explanations for the  change in  the standard  deviation of  wages between skill 
groups  and  play  a  negligible  role  in  changes  in  the  within-group standard 
deviation. In  addition, institutions  explain  a  significant share  (more  than  30 
percent)  of  the  change  in  the within-group standard  deviation. Overall, the 
various factors explain almost all  the  changes in the between-group standard 
deviation  and  more  than  half  of  the  change  in  the  within-group  standard 
de~iation.~' 
One surprising result, however, is that changes in the minimum wage are an 
important  explanation for changes in both  the within- and the between-group 
standard deviation of  log wages. This raises the question of  why  have the large 
number  of  studies that focused on  changes in  wage  dispersion between skill 
groups failed to identify the important role played by the minimum wage? Part 
of  the answer may  be that many important studies, such as Katz and Murphy 
(1992), Murphy and Welch (1992), and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (19931, have 
relied heavily on samples of  full-time men drawn from the March CPS. In such 
samples, less weight is put on minimum wage workers who are more likely to 
work part-time.33 It is also clear from Figure 1 that the minimum wage is less 
likely to emerge as a key factor in descriptive work that focuses on men rather 
than on women. 
Another part of the answer may be that the importance of the minimum wage 
has been masked by  a focus on a few standard wage differentials. For instance, 
many  studies  have  looked  primarily  at  explanations  for  changes  in  the 
college/high  school wage premium. As Table IV indicates, the minimum wage 
played no role in the 0.141 increase in the college/high  school premium for men 
30~he variables included in our log wage regressions  consist of  32 gender-experience-education 
dummies  (corresponding to the  groups defined  in Section 3.4) fully  interacted  with  experience, 
experience squared, years of  education, a marital status dummy, and a race dummy. 
310ne advantage of  decomposing the variance (or the standard deviation) into a between  and a 
within component is that these two components aggregate up to the total variance. Measures like 
the  10-90  differential  do not aggregate up. The results of  the between/within  decomposition are 
not very sensitive, however, to the choice of  inequality indices. We find that the within component 
accounts for 43 percent of  the increase in the variance  of  wages. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) 
obtain the same percentage for the same time period using the 10-90  differential. 
''changes  in  the distribution  of  attributes  include  changes  in the industrial and occupational 
distribution of the workforce. This explains why changes in the distribution of attributes accounts for 
a third of  the change in the within-group standard deviation. 
33 The estimated effect of the minimum wage on the standard deviation of men's wages falls from 
0.018 to 0.013 when we exclude part-time workers. 1034  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
TABLE IV 

CHANGES  BETWEEN  1979-1988
 IN WAGEDISPERSION  AND WITHIN SKILL GROUPS: 
Effect of: 
Total  Mlnlmum  Indlvlduala  Supply&  ~nexplatned' 
Statistic  Change  Wage  Unlons  Attrlbutea  Demand  Change 
Standard Deviation 

Within Groups 

Between Groups 
Education Differentials 
(0-9  years of  exp.) 
High School-Dropout 
College-High School 
Education Differentials 
(20-29  yrs. of exp.) 
High School-Dropout 
College-High School 
Experience DifferentialsC 
Dropouts 
High School 
College 
Standard Deviation 
Within Groups 
Between Groups 
Education Differentials 
(0-9 yrs. of exp.) 
High School-Dropout 
College-High School 
Education Differentials 
(20-29  yrs. of exp.) 
High School-Dropout 
College-High School 
Experience DifferentialsC 
Dropouts 
High School 
College 
Note: Percent of total variation  explained  in parentheais. 

aThe  individual attributes are experience squared, education, SMSA, marital status, full-time or part-time, 3 occupational 

and 19 industry classes. 
b"~nexplained"  is the residual not accounted for by  all other factors. See text for further explanation. 
'Difference  between the mean log wage of workers with 20 to 29 years of experience and the mean log wage of workers 
with 0 to 9 years of experience. 1035  LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS 
with  20  to 29  years of  experience. Even for young men with  0 to 9 years of 
experience, the minimum wage only  explains  10 percent  of  the striking 0.228 
increase in the college/high  school premium. These results are comparable to 
those of  Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1992) who find that the effect of the 
minimum wage on changes in the college/high  school differentials ranges from 
0.00 to 0.01. 
On  the  other  hand,  Blackburn,  Bloom, and  Freeman  (1992) report  much 
larger effects of the minimum wage (0.04) on changes in the high school/dropout 
wage differential for black females. The magnitude of  this effect compares to 
our estimated effect of  the minimum wage on changes in high school/dropout 
differentials  for young  men  (0.06) and women (0.04).  This  suggests that  the 
minimum wage  has  a sizable effect on differentials involving the lowest  paid 
groups of workers (black female or youth who have not completed high school). 
This helps explain why, for men, the minimum wage has an important effect on 
changes in measures that put more weight on the tails than on the middle of the 
distribution, like the variance of  log wages or Theil's coefficient. 
Lastly, one important difference between this and previous work is a matter of 
emphasis. For example, Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1992) have  already 
noted  that  the  minimum wage  has  a  sizable effect  on changes  in  wages  of 
low-paid workers.34  Our "visual" approach directly highlights this fact. Although 
previous research has found some distributional effects of  the minimum wage, 
our  graphical  analysis  shows  more  clearly  that  minimum  wages  cannot  be 
ignored in any study of  the determinants of  changes in wage inequality over the 
1980's-especially  for women. 
6.  SUPPORTING  EVIDENCE 
6.1.  Reversing the Order of the Decomposition 
In Table V, we  repeat  the analysis of  Table  I11  in reverse order. We thus 
perform our sequential analysis beginning with the effect of  changes in supply 
and demand, followed by  the effect of  individual attributes other than unioniza- 
tion, then by  unionization, and with minimum wage effects last. Reversing the 
order of  the decomposition unambiguously increases the effect of  supply and 
demand factors and diminishes the role of  changes in the minimum wage. The 
rationale behind this result is that fewer "low-skilled" workers would have been 
at risk of  being affected by  the minimum wage in  1988 if  the demand for their 
services had not deteriorated the way it did over the 1980's. Holding supply and 
34~~rrigan and Mincy (1993) also find that the minimum wage has a larger impact on workers in 
the lower tail of  the distribution than on other workers. Their conclusion that raising the minimum 
wage would have only a small effect on the 1987 distribution of wages is not necessarily incornpati- 
ble, however, with minimum wages having a sizable effect on changes in the distribution of  wages. 
The latter is a question of what percentage of  the total change in the distribution is explained  by 
changes in the minimum wage. 1036  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
TABLE V 
Effect of: 
Total  Supply &  Indivlduala  Minimum  unexplainedb 
Statistic  Change  Demand  Attributes  Unions  Wage  Change 
MEN: 
Standard 
DeviationC 
10-9od 
10-50 
50-90 
25-75 
5-95 
Theil's 
Coefficient 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Kullback-
Leibler 'J'e 
WOMEN: 
Standard 
DeviationC 
10-9od 
10-50 
50-90 
25-75 
5-95 
Theil's 
Coefficient 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Kullback-
Leibler 'J'e 
Note: Percent of  total variation  explained in  parenthesis. 

"he  individual attr~butes  are experience, experience squared, education, SMSA, marital status, full-time or part-tlme, 3 

occupational and 19 industry classes. 
h"~nexplained"  is the residual not accounted for by all other factors. See text for further explanation. 
'Standard  deviation of log wage distribution. 
'~ifference  between the 90th and the 10th percentiles of  the log wage distribution. The 10-50,  50-90,  25-75,  and 5-95 
statistics are defined similarly. 
"~ullback  and Leibler's 'J' statistic is a measure of divergence between two distributions fl and f,: 
The effect of an  explanatory factor indicates  how  much  of  the  divergence between  the  1988 and  the  1979 density  is 
explained by  replacing the 1988 density by the corresponding counterfactual density. 1037  LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS 
demand  conditions  at  their  1979 level  thus  reduces  the  potential  impact  of 
changes in the minimum wage. 
Note that  for men, however, the  impact of  changes in  unionization on the 
standard deviation of  log wages increases from 14.3 percent to 21 percent of  the 
total change when we reverse the order of the decomposition. The total effect of 
labor market  institutions, approximately 38 percent  of  the total change in  the 
standard  deviation, is  thus  relatively  robust  to  changes  in  the  order  of  the 
decomposition. While the precise percentages  explained by  the various factors 
are not identical when we reverse the order of  the decomposition, the qualita- 
tive results are not affected. 
6.2. Changes in the Distribution of  Wages: 1973-1979 and 1988-1992 
Over  the  1973-79  period,  both  the  real  value  of  the  minimum  wage  and 
coverage rose  substantially. The unionization  rate  increased  slightly  for both 
men  and women  because  of  the  growth in  public sector unionization. If  our 
results  for  1979-88  are  not  spurious  consequences  of  the  particular  period 
analyzed, the effect of  labor market institutions on changes in wage inequality 
for  1973-79  should  be  the  reverse  of  that  which  we  obtain  for  1979-88. 
Increases  in  minimum wages  and unionization  rates  should therefore  reduce 
wage inequality over the 1973-79  period. 
In  Table  VI, we  decompose the changes  in  the  standard  deviation of  log 
wages  for the period  1973-1979,  as well  as  for  1988-92.  For men, minimum 
wage changes explain 35 percent of  the decline in the standard deviation of  log 
wages  for  the  1973 to  1979 period,  while  unions  explain  26  percent.35 For 
women, changes in  the minimum wage explain 29 percent of  the decline in the 
standard deviation of  log wages, while changes in  the  unionization rate  have 
virtually  no  effect.  These  results  support  our  prediction  that  labor  market 
institutions  should have  opposite  effects  over the  1973-79  and  the  1979-88 
periods. 
We also decompose the standard deviation of log wages into a between- and a 
within-group component in Table VI. One important feature of our May/outgo- 
ing rotation group CPS data is that the within-group standard  deviation of  log 
wages decreased between 1973 and 1979. This is at odds with analyses based on 
March  CPS  data  which  concluded  that  wage  dispersion  within  skill  groups 
increased during the 1970's (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)). It is consistent, 
however, with results reported by Card and Lemieux (1996) using data similar to 
35~he effect of changes in the level of  unionization  on changes in wage inequality is entirely due 
to the  growth  of  public  sector unionization  over  this  period, which went  from 23  percent  to 38 
percent. Private  sector unionization  declined from 24 percent  to 22  percent  over this period  and 
would have caused a slight increase of 0.0003 in the standard deviation of  log wages for men. J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
TABLE VI 
CHANGES  OF WAGE  DISPERSION:  IN MEASURES  1973-79  AND 1988-92 
1973-79:  1988-92: 
Effect of:  Effect of: 
Total  Minrmum  Total  Mlnimum 
Statistrc  Change  Wage  Unions  Change  Wage  Unions 
Standard Deviation 
Total 
Within Groups 
Between Groups 
Education Differentials 
(0-9  yrs. of exp.) 
High School-Dropout 
College-High School 
Education Differentials 
(20-29 yrs. of  exp.) 
High School-Dropout 
College-High School 
Standard Deviation 
Total 
Within Groups 
Between Groups 
Education Differentials 
(0-9  yrs. of exp.) 
High School-Dropout 
College-High School 
Education Differentials 
(20-29  yrs. of  exp.) 
High School-Dropout 
College-High School 
Note: Percent of  total variation explained in parenthesis. 1039  LABOR  MARKET  INSTITUTIONS 
Table  VI  also  shows  that,  as  in  1979-88,  the  minimum  wage  was 
important  in  explaining  changes  in  both  the within-  and  the between-group 
standard deviation of  wages over the 1973-79  period. 
The  period  1988-1992  is  less  interesting  for  the  analysis  of  institutional 
factors since there was  virtually  no  change in  the unionization  rate  over this 
period for men or women, and minimum wages rose only by  11 percent  from 
1988 to 1992.~' We nevertheless present  the 1988-1992  results for complete- 
ness. We show in Table VI that, for men, there was virtually no change in the 
standard deviation of log wages. For women, the results show a slight increase in 
wage inequality as measured by  the standard deviation of log wages with neither 
unions nor minimum wages explaining much of  the effect. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we  have proposed  and implemented a semiparametric proce- 
dure to analyze the effect of  various factors on changes in  the distribution of 
wages. This procedure yields a visually clear representation of precisely where in 
the distribution various factors have their greatest impact. It could be fruitfully 
applied to  many  other problems where  it  is  useful to know what  part  of  the 
distribution is affected. For example, the procedure could be used to illustrate 
the impact of  social programs, such as welfare and unemployment insurance, on 
the distribution of  family income. 
As has been documented in previous research, we  also find that de-unioniza- 
tion and supply and demand shocks are important factors explaining the rise in 
wage inequality from 1979 to 1988. In addition, however, we find that the decline 
in the real value of  the minimum wage from 1979 to 1988 explains a substantial 
proportion  of  the increase  in  wage  inequality, particularly for women and for 
others in the lower tail of  the wage distribution. We conclude that labor market 
institutions are as important as supply and demand considerations in explaining 
changes in the U.S. distribution of  wages from 1979 to 1988. 
We  also find that  the increase in  unionization and in  the real value of  the 
minimum wage  between  1973 and  1979 contributed  to the  decrease  in  wage 
inequality over that period. In an earlier version of  this paper (DiNardo, Fortin, 
and Lemieux (1994)), we showed that changes in the value of the minimum wage 
had a larger impact on changes in wage inequality in "low wage" states than in 
"high wage" states. We also showed that the relative constancy of  the unioniza- 
36 Card and Lemieux (1996) report that the within-group wage dispersion measured by  either the 
standard deviation of  log wages or by the 10-90  differential  decreased between 1973 and 1979. Note 
also  that,  because  of  changes  in  the  composition  of  the workforce,  the  between-group standard 
deviation  remained  constant  for  men  despite  the  fact  that  most  education  wage  differentials 
decreased  between  1973 and  1979. However,  a  "fixed  weight"  measure  of  the  between-groups 
standard deviation would show a substantial decline over this period. 
37 By  1988, many  states had  legislated  minimum  wage  increases  above  the  federal  minimum. 
When appropriate, we thus use these state minimum wages to compute the effect of changes in the 
minimum wage on changes in the distribution of wages between  1988 and 1992. 1040  J.  DINARDO, N. FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
tion  rate  in  Canada  over the  1980's was  an important reason  for the  slower 
growth of  inequality in Canada as compared to the United States. This provides 
additional  evidence  of  the  importance  of  labor  market  institutions  in  recent 
changes in the distribution of wages. 
Our findings about the importance of labor market institutions are in concor- 
dance with analyses that were common before the advent of  the widespread use 
of  "marginal productivity analysis"  as it was called, and the growing focus on 
"economic" factors, such as supply and demand, in empirical labor economics. 
For  example, in  Lester's  (1964)  analysis  of  the  wage  structure,  supply  and 
demand played an important but secondary role to such factors as the extent of 
unionization  and  the  minimum  wage.  Our  findings  suggest  that  this  earlier 
emphasis was not misplaced. 
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TABLE A1 
Year 
Standard 
Deviation 
of  Log Wage  10-90 
Percentiles 
of Log Wage Distribution: 
10-50  50-90  25-75  5-95 
Theil's 
Entropy 
Coefficient 
Gini 
Coefficient 1042  J.  DINARDO,  N.  FORTIN,  AND  T.  LEMIEUX 
TABLE A2 
SENSITIV~TY OF THE RESULTS TO ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
ON THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 
Effect of the Minimum Wage on: 
Standard  10-50 
Deviation 
(a) Baseline: 1979-1988 with Minimum Wage =$3.00 
Men  0.018  0.050  -0.000 
(24.8)  (65.7)  (- 0.4) 
Women  0.027  0.150  -0.002 
(30.2)  (61.7)  (- 2.5) 
(b) Baseline with Disemployment Elasticity of 0.15 
Men  0.020  0.054  0.002 
(28.6)  (71.2)  (1.7) 
Women  0.029  0.148  0.003 
(32.6)  (60.7)  (3.9) 
(c) Baseline with Wages Below the 1988 Minimum Unaffected 
Men  0.020  0.053  -0,000 
(28.1)  (69.7)  (-0.0) 
Women  0.029  0.154  -0,000 
(32.4)  (63.2)  (-0.0) 
(d)  1979-1988 with Minimum Wage =$2.90 
Men  0.007  0.033  -0,001 
(9.7)  (43.7)  (- 1.3) 
Women  0.014  0.118  -0.003 
(15.1)  (48.7)  (- 3.3) 
(el 1978-1988 with Minimum Wage =$2.65 
Men  0.008  0.032  0.001 
(13.0)  (47.6)  (0.9) 
Women  0.020  0.127  0.002 
(23.4)  (54.0)  (2.3) 
Note: Percent of  total variation  explained in parenthesis. 
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